María Sanhueza, Sinologist: «The geopolitical order has already changed; it is no longer unipolar.»

María Sanhueza became known in 2006 for being a spokesperson and student leader of the «Penguin Revolution,» in which Chilean high school students demanded free, high-quality public education. As a student at the Liceo Carmela Carvajal in the Providencia district, María stood out in the media as the youngest spokesperson for the Coordinating Assembly of Secondary Students (ACES) due to her firm and direct approach in conveying the movement’s demands to journalists and politicians.

Years later, Sanhueza moved to Germany, settling in Heidelberg to study German. She later moved to Vienna, where she specialized in Chinese culture, studying at the Department of Sinology at the University of Vienna and the Department of Philosophy at the same institution. Additionally, María co-founded a contemporary art space in Vienna, where she continues to work as a curator, cultural manager, and researcher. She has also lived in Beijing and Shanghai and traveled extensively throughout China, deepening her knowledge and becoming one of the few female Sinologists from Chile. She continues her work promoting a transcultural and multidisciplinary debate.

-Can you tell us about your studies on China?

-I believe my studies on China have been a long journey in the deep Taoist sense, understanding the Tao (道) as a path, thus inexorably intertwined with my personal life and destiny. The possibility of dedicating myself to Sinology was largely a result of Yuanfen (缘分), a Chinese concept that can be translated as «predestination.» In my case, it manifested through intricate twists of fate, which brought Chinese studies into my life at a time when I could fully commit to it.

In a formal sense, I spent approximately four years at the University of Vienna’s Department of Sinology, where I had the privilege of being taught by Frau Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, a world-renowned Sinologist. She was a pioneer in addressing 20th-century Chinese history and historiography. Appointed in 1989 at the age of 33 as a Professor of Modern Sinology at Heidelberg University, she made significant contributions to the development of contemporary Chinese studies in the German-speaking world, with her most recent work taking place in Vienna, where she also served as Vice-Rector for Research at the University of Vienna. My education in this context was top-notch, providing me early exposure to the resilience of the Chinese system and the opportunity to study contemporary China—a subject that is politically marginalized in European academic discourse.

I also received a key part of my education at the Department of Intercultural Philosophy at the University of Vienna, where I focused on comparative philosophy, starting from Critical Theory and German phenomenology. Here, I had access to the few scholars working at the intersection of Sinology and philosophy, whose expertise in classical Chinese texts and contemporary debates was essential in shaping my interdisciplinary path.

In essence, my education mirrors Chinese philosophy in its syncretic nature, focused on creating an autonomous line of thought while acknowledging a broader order of things, which one aspires to grasp and interpret.

-How can we approach understanding Chinese culture from our Western and Latin American perspectives?

-There are many parallels, both epistemological and historical, between the two cultural continents (China and Latin America) that facilitate mutual understanding. Historically, both China and Latin America were home to great pre-modern civilizations, thus inheriting millenary cultural legacies that coexist syncretically in the contemporary era.

Both regions were victims of colonization, although in China, this process was never total and lasted less time than in Latin America. Nevertheless, the historical trauma of colonization is significant in both cases. They both suffered the consequences of imperialism, including the unilateral exploitation of resources, lack of political and economic autonomy, and structural disadvantages in integrating into international institutions or modernizing. In today’s context of political reordering, these regions share the need for a new order that surpasses the unipolarity imposed by the United States. Both strive to reflect on their current developments broadly, integrating the cultural legacies of their civilizations while questioning the criteria of «progress» imposed during colonization.

In both regions, there is a strong critique of the environmental consequences of the modernization process, rooted in their own cosmologies. This critique is tied to a growing need to live in harmony with nature, a concept that transcends their pre-modern cosmologies and ways of life. In China, this approach aligns with that of Latin American societies with indigenous traditions.

Epistemologically, there are also parallels. Latin American cosmologies and Chinese philosophy focus on the natural world, not from an anthropocentric perspective (as is largely the case in Europe, where the naturalist tradition was crushed centuries ago). Both are oriented towards harmony and balance between humans and nature.

I have personally experienced these parallels with the Latin American worldview and the differences with Western philosophy and political theory, as I dedicated years to comparative studies between Chinese philosophy and European continental philosophy. I spent years attempting to force a dialogue between Adorno and Zhuangzi, between Laozi and Hegel, between Kant and Mozi. This relativized the value of Chinese philosophical tradition, which many in Western academia refuse to define as philosophy because they believe it lacks Transzendenz (transcendence).

Ultimately, I decided to shift the starting point (Ausgangspunkt) of comparative philosophy from the German-speaking academic world towards the Latin American worldview, specifically towards the Mapuche cosmology, with which I find numerous parallels. This is a recent shift in my research. I am optimistic about the results this approach could generate, precisely because of the multiple points in common between both cultures.

For example, in Chinese, the concept of «person» is expressed as «ren» (人), and in Mapudungun as «Che», both terms recognizing the human being as part of a whole, linked to harmony between heaven and earth. This is not in the sense of a monotheistic entity, but as a set of natural laws or cycles of nature that, in both cultures, are above humans, who are considered an integral part of that whole. Just as in Mapuche cosmology, one cannot understand «che» without «Mapu», in Chinese thought, one cannot understand «ren» (人) without «Tian» (天).

-What can we learn from China?

-A key reference in understanding China is the book by French sinologist and philosopher François Jullien, titled “Umwege” ( Detours in English). In it, Jullien explains the reasons for studying China, which align with reasons I consider valid for myself and extend to all of the West. He argues that China can provide answers to questions forgotten by Western academia—ontological questions about being and the whole. These are crucial themes for understanding ourselves, our environment, and making sense of life, yet they have fallen out of favor in Western academic discourse, dominated by rationalization, positivism, and scientific imperatives.

In a time of major changes—a global reordering and a questioning of the dominant systems—perhaps we are witnessing a civilizational shift, and certainly a turning point where the survival of planetary life and its rich biodiversity is at stake. Given this, it’s essential that we revisit these forgotten questions. This need is even more pressing in light of a growing transhumanist trend linked to a political-economic project for humanity. In this regard, China has much to offer.

Unlike Latin American indigenous traditions, China’s rich cosmology is systematically documented and has continuity over several millennia, making it unique, accessible, and exquisite. China has undergone—and continues to undergo—radical transformations. More than 2,000 years ago, Chinese intellectuals were already asking questions that concern us today. We can enrich ourselves by reflecting in this civilizational mirror, as Jullien suggested for Europeans. While this idea may not have found much acceptance in Europe, it could resonate in Latin America due to epistemological parallels between both cultures.

Contemporary China, with its remarkable economic and ecological development and its pivot toward a more sustainable society, has much to teach us. Its trajectory is closely tied to a renewed connection with its natural philosophy, which is resurging. As a result, China serves as an example and case study for many developing countries facing environmental disasters alongside economic growth challenges.

– What are the most relevant cultural elements of China to understand Oriental society in contrast to Western society?

-We cannot equate China with the entire Orient, as that region is much broader and more complex. However, we can draw comparisons, with China serving as an example of an «Eastern» society—or, more accurately, a non-Western one.

From a historical perspective, given China’s intense modernization and rapid change, some of the most interesting points of comparison are the fact that «Eastern» societies are primarily collective. This means that individuals recognize themselves as part of a social group, and from that foundation, they build their value systems, epistemologies, and ontological questions. This is vastly different from the individualistic societies of the West, where individuals are solely responsible for defining and determining themselves. This contrast is especially intriguing when examined through archetypal lenses.

One consequence of this distinction is that in the West, the theme of guilt predominates (which arises and is directed towards the individual). Meanwhile, in Eastern societies, shame takes precedence—a sense of responsibility shaped by how one’s actions are perceived by others. These differences are essential in understanding how both societies function and are fascinating to analyze, especially when considering how the unconscious and the ego are constructed.

Another critical difference is between predominantly monotheistic Western society and polytheistic or animistic Eastern traditions (though this is a simplification). In China, there has never been a dominant religion or a concept of heaven and hell like those in monotheistic religions. Instead, there is an emphasis on the here and now, something that can intuitively be identified in Chinese pragmatism and even the flexibility of the Chinese system. Politics in China has been understood as a practical matter, oriented towards stable, long-term governance. While there is a relationship with «natural principles,» governance has been essentially secular for over 2,000 years. 

This legacy is not easily forgotten, and even though the ruling party identifies with communist ideology, governance is not always marked by ideologies as it is in the West. Instead, there is a strong pragmatic element in defining public policies and strategies. This approach offers great flexibility and resilience to the system, enabling it to incorporate seemingly «contradictory» elements, such as the predominance of a free market system under communist ideology. I believe this is one of the most challenging aspects of the Chinese system for Westerners to understand. Studying Chinese history and political theory can help bridge this comprehension gap.

– Is the global geopolitical order really changing? What can we expect in the coming decades?

-Yes, the global geopolitical order has already shifted significantly. The unipolar dominance led by the United States and, more broadly, the West, over the past few decades has given way to a multipolar world. For a time, many believed in the «end of history» (as theorized by Francis Fukuyama), where liberal democracy and free-market capitalism would reign as the universal order. The first two decades of the 21st century seemed to confirm this with widespread globalization and adherence to a common economic system.

«The geopolitical order has already changed; it is no longer unipolar.»

maría jesus sanhueza

However, history has predominantly been multipolar. For centuries, China and India were major centers of power in Asia, much like the Inca, Maya, and Aztec civilizations in the Americas. The unipolar moment of the late 20th and early 21st century was an anomaly in this broader historical context. What we are witnessing today could be seen as a return to a more «natural» state of global affairs, with Asia, and particularly China, reclaiming its position as a major pole of power.

The current multipolarity differs from the bipolarity of the Cold War. During the Cold War, ideologically opposed superpowers (the U.S. and the USSR) dominated global politics, with China acting as an independent pole. The loss of this clear ideological division, along with the decline of former powers like the U.K. and the non-aligned movement, gave rise to extreme unipolarity. But this has now changed, with several key developments exemplifying the shift:

– War in Ukraine: This conflict and the successive waves of sanctions it triggered have revealed cracks in the international order. Many countries, representing more than 50% of the world’s population, have abstained from fully backing these sanctions. This reflects a growing dissatisfaction with the current global order, which is often criticized as hypocritical for selectively addressing human rights violations based on political interests. This criticism has gained even more traction after the outbreak of the Gaza conflict, intensifying debates in the Global South.

– New Cooperative Frameworks: Bilateral and multilateral agreements outside the traditional international institutional framework are proliferating. These include the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s growing ties with Africa (FOCAC), and various agreements between China and countries like Oman and Saudi Arabia for energy, and India and Russia for arms deals. The BRICS bloc is also emerging as an alternative to Western-dominated forums like the G20 and G7. These developments challenge the existing order and build parallel pathways that erode the old structures.

– Economic Contraction and Crisis: The economic impacts of this shift are already being felt in households worldwide. The global economy is highly sensitive to these changes, and the foundations of globalization—open markets, dynamic trade, and integrated supply chains—are being disrupted. This disruption is further aggravated by conflicts in Ukraine and tensions around Taiwan, both of which have the potential to severely affect global trade.

Looking ahead, we are likely to see more regional or bloc-based trade agreements that bypass traditional international organizations like the World Trade Organization (WTO). A deepening of multipolarity, with its inherent conflicts, seems inevitable, as countries and regions assert their own interests. The rise of alternative economic systems, trade agreements using local currencies, and military alliances outside the Western sphere are all part of this trend.

The risk of large-scale conflicts that could threaten humanity’s survival cannot be discounted. In parallel, the environmental crisis looms ever larger, requiring a collective global effort. However, the current fragmented geopolitical landscape makes coordinated action on climate change increasingly difficult.

In summary, the coming decades are likely to be characterized by further divergence from the old unipolar order, growing multipolarity, potential conflicts, and a challenging global environment that complicates cooperation on existential threats like climate change.

-What is the real importance of BRICS and what does it translate into economically and socioculturally?

BRICS is increasingly gaining importance beyond its intrinsic capabilities. This is because it has become a major reference point for envisioning an alternative order. We see that the key countries challenging the hegemony and overrepresentation of the U.S. in international institutions, and demanding greater influence for themselves, are the very architects of BRICS, such as China, India, and Russia.

These major powers not only express their desires for a more pronounced multipolarity and fairer conditions for economic exchange agreements within BRICS, but also a significant and growing number of countries share these aspirations. This includes many countries in Latin America and Africa, which see BRICS as a hope for more favorable terms in their trade or loans, compared to the stringent conditions imposed by the IMF or the World Bank. We also see wealthy countries, such as Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern nations, viewing BRICS as an alternative to the current model in which they are not represented, and from which, despite their economic power, they have been excluded.

BRICS has de facto become a reference point for this multiplicity of desires, expectations, and urgencies for a new global order, and has transitioned from being merely an economic cooperation forum to a symbol of the emergence of a multipolar order. The key to this transition may lie in the equitable representation of these new powers that currently do not have a place at the table of existing institutions and are excluded from international decision-making or feel underrepresented. The case of India is particularly notable, as it is the most populous country on the planet, an emerging superpower, yet it does not even have a seat on the UN Security Council.

This is the main importance of BRICS, as without it, none of what I have mentioned would have a concrete development channel. BRICS can contain and channel many of these concerns, and although its scope is limited (as it remains essentially an economic cooperation forum), it can serve as a laboratory to test new models of cooperation and exchange that are not related to the prevailing financial institutions. An example of this is the internal debate on de-dollarization and bilateral agreements among some members to trade in local currencies.

-After three decades of rapid growth, China is experiencing a slowdown. How can this be explained and what are the prospects in the medium and long term?

This economic recession is not merely a Chinese phenomenon, but part of a global economic downturn exacerbated by the pandemic and intensified by a shift in international politics from economic to political considerations, with major powers making economic commitments primarily to pursue geopolitical objectives.

China made a significant effort to integrate into the international order by opening its markets to foreign capital and accepting the rules of globalization. Based on this, it underwent a massive process of modernization, industrialization, technological advancement, and unparalleled economic growth. However, it later realized that these rules did not represent a sincere effort to build an equitable international system, as promised by the rhetoric of free markets ensuring that those with competitive advantages would win. It has become increasingly evident that much of the pro-globalization discourse was largely a reflection of what was convenient for the U.S. at a given time. The U.S., as an economic exporter, and with its substantial military presence and overrepresentation in international institutions, managed to impose its vision and interests somewhat effectively for a couple of decades. However, in recent years, there has been growing disillusionment and increasing questioning of this reality.

When China, operating under these external rules, ceased to be the so-called «world’s factory» – a place of low-cost production but also a significant consumer market for high-value foreign products – the U.S. unilaterally changed the rules of the game and began a series of policies aimed at undermining Chinese growth (a trend that Central Europe has recently joined), reaching its peak in the so-called «trade war.» This involved a series of sanctions on Chinese products competing with U.S. goods, aimed at making it harder for Chinese products to access the U.S. market and reducing their competitiveness. However, the U.S. continued to expect and demand that China, in turn, maintain its open access without restrictions, which, of course, China is unwilling to accept. This has had a significant impact on the Chinese economy and deepened the economic recession, which is also reflected globally.

It is not possible to isolate the issue of Chinese economic growth from geopolitics, as both are two sides of the same coin. China, like the international political order, must be restructured considering that the free market system dominant during unipolarity seems to have come to an end. Neither Europe nor the U.S. is willing to accept high-value Chinese products if it harms their economic interests, and we see this reflected in an increase in protectionist policies internally, which constantly undermines the economic structure of the previous order under the banner of globalization.

Therefore, it is difficult to predict the growth figures that existed during the era when globalization was in a state of reorganization. However, there is still sustained economic growth in China, which is interesting considering the global contraction. This reflects its strategic capacity for transformation and reorientation towards other markets and highly competitive technology products that meet current market needs, in which many times U.S. or European products are not as competitive, such as in the solar panel and electric vehicle industries.

In conclusion, while China is not expected to achieve the growth figures of the 1980s, 1990s, or early 2000s, it is likely to maintain sustained economic growth and continue to reorient towards new markets, with an even stronger shift towards the digitalization and technologization of its industry.

-In the 1980s, China implemented a controversial measure to control its population by allowing only one child per couple. Today, China has experienced two years of population decline for the first time. What are the medium- and long-term consequences of this population decrease?

-China has historically faced demographic problems, which is often forgotten. Many dynasties experienced these issues, as did early 20th-century China and the Mao era, and it continues today, with the difference being that its problem was overpopulation, and now it faces a decline. For much of human history, China was the most populous country (civilization), and given its limited arable land, this represented significant challenges and made demographic issues a constant concern for its governments.

Currently, China is facing a serious demographic decline, which could pose significant challenges for its future due to the lack of young people, a crucial factor for economic growth. This is combined with the issue of caring for and supporting an aging population, which already far exceeds the younger population.

The government has attempted to encourage the youth to have more children, but it is challenging for young people to envision this, as there is still no established welfare state and the economic cost of raising children is very high. This creates a disincentive for young people who are building their careers or struggling to enter the labor market during economic contraction.

However, this, like the economic crisis, is also a global phenomenon. China is part of a global trend, with the particularity that, due to the relative weight of its economy, its demographic problem and its economic implications could have consequences for the entire world.

-China has been criticized for decades for its highly polluting production methods. Is China now effectively producing in a more environmentally friendly way, or is this just greenwashing?

-This is a very interesting issue, as it intersects with historical and colonial legacies and the historical context of industrialization. The major powers were the ones that industrialized quickly, giving them significant economic and military advantages. But this process came at a high environmental cost, something we are very familiar with in Latin America. This was also one of the causes of the colonial period due to the increasing demand for natural resources by colonial powers. Today, those same powers are driving the Green Agenda and criticizing emerging countries for their lack of environmental policies, which often respond with resentment and defend their own industrialization processes, similar to those experienced by the major powers, but out of sync.

Thus, there is a historical and political context that should not be overlooked, and China is part of this context as it began its industrialization process comparatively late, only in the 1950s, and with significant force during the 1980s. At that time, it was a rapid process with little regard for environmental concerns due to the poverty in which China was situated. However, this has changed significantly, and China has made an unprecedented transition to renewable energies in record time. This is intertwined with the immense economic growth and consequent social transformations, as the prosperity brought by rapid growth generated new interests and problems within China, such as a strong interest in environmentally friendly development and increased environmental awareness among the population. This is reflected in the government’s strong interest in sustainable development, addressing a range of factors, including avoiding potential political conflicts and discontent among the population, re-aligning with its own traditional natural philosophy, and dealing with concrete geographic issues due to the deterioration of certain ecosystems. Additionally, China’s reality of having more inhabitants than available natural resources necessitates extreme attention to resource management, as resources are very limited.

Moreover, and this is the most interesting point to highlight, China has economically pivoted towards the production of sustainable products, becoming the global leader in solar and wind energy, as well as the largest producer of solar panels and electric vehicles. It has also carried out the most ambitious reforestation project in human history, “The Great Green Wall,” which involves planting over 50 billion trees. These, among other significant elements, are part of its green transition and its plans to become a zero-emissions power by 2060.

Therefore, I believe this is not greenwashing but rather a macroeconomic transformation that does not solely address political interests or agendas but also has a very concrete economic interest. By transforming its industry towards these sectors, China has a specific economic interest in the world making this transition. Furthermore, we often forget that China remains a developing country, categorized as upper-middle income, like Mexico and Brazil, with a sector of the population still having a modest consumption power. This is reflected in per capita pollution levels that differ significantly from developed or high-income countries. China does not rank among the top fifty most polluting countries per capita (based on data from international agencies such as the International Energy Agency), even falling below Chile! However, due to its size, it is the largest polluter in absolute terms, responsible for approximately 30% of global CO2 emissions, placing it in the spotlight when discussing the climate crisis. While it remains one of the most polluting countries, this is not due to the lifestyle of its inhabitants, nor does it negate the fact that an unprecedented green transition has occurred. It is related to its size and industrial capacity.

This is the problem when analyzing these issues without considering the historical context and colonial legacy. Developing countries legitimately claim their right to pursue economic growth processes, and not having large capital often makes it difficult to focus more on sustainability. Nevertheless, it is clear that the world is not at the same point of development as during the colonial period and is facing an unprecedented environmental crisis, which places high pressure on making the green transition as soon as possible, leaving no room for unsustainable growth.

-One aspect that concerns local producers in Chile and globally is that they cannot compete with the prices of Chinese products, leading many to go bankrupt. What is your view on this situation?

-This issue is not necessarily about China itself but rather about Chile’s economic and development model, which is oriented towards the export of low-cost raw materials and relies on importing high-value products. This perpetuates the vicious cycle of underdevelopment, a reality that affects all of its trading partners.

Unlike other countries in the region, Chile did not undergo a significant industrialization process. Before the free trade agreement with China (which Chile was a pioneer in Latin America), there was a small artisanal industry that could not compete with the low production costs of Chinese products. However, this small industry was unfortunately not significant enough to impact the national economy, which has been, and still is, focused on exporting natural, agricultural, and livestock resources—industries that saw exponential growth due to the opening of the Chinese market.

Therefore, there is a fundamental issue to address regarding the type of economic development being promoted in Chile, its strategy, sustainability, and beneficiaries. This issue is not directly related to China but is an internal problem in Chile’s relationship with the rest of the world. Specifically, and within the logic of this model, China represents an economic development opportunity for the country. Although China does not need to import highly complex products, it is a large market for Chilean products. Unlike other trading partners who have applied a purely extractive model, China presents itself as a commercial partner open to infrastructure investment in the country—a model that China promotes in its commercial relationships, referred to as “mutual benefit,” distinguishing it from other partners. This approach positions China as an attractive trade partner, not just for Chile but for the entire region, regardless of political sectors.

For instance, during the last government visit to China last year, Chile secured an unprecedented agreement for the co-production of lithium batteries worth over $250 million. This deal not only represents a historic milestone in Chile’s commercial agreements but also includes a technology transfer agreement. It is a «win-win» agreement that benefits both countries (as China also aims to secure its lithium supply) and contrasts with the purely extractive nature of Chile’s relations with other trading partners.

HIGHLIGHTS:

– x

– “It is expected that the multipolar trend will deepen, with the conflicts it generates due to the multiplicity of interests at play that often lead to disputes.”

– “Unfortunately, it is also impossible to rule out the escalation of major conflicts that threaten the survival of humanity and life on the planet.”

– “China has strategically pivoted towards the production of sustainable products, now being the world leader in solar and wind energy capacity, as well as the largest producer of solar panels and electric vehicles.”

«The geopolitical order has already changed; it is no longer unipolar.»

María Sanhueza became known in 2006 for being a spokesperson and student leader of the «Penguin Revolution,» in which Chilean high school students demanded free, high-quality public education. As a student at the Liceo Carmela Carvajal in the Providencia district, María stood out in the media as the youngest spokesperson for the Coordinating Assembly of Secondary Students (ACES) due to her firm and direct approach in conveying the movement’s demands to journalists and politicians.

Years later, Sanhueza moved to Germany, settling in Heidelberg to study German. She later moved to Vienna, where she specialized in Chinese culture, studying at the Department of Sinology at the University of Vienna and the Department of Philosophy at the same institution. Additionally, María co-founded a contemporary art space in Vienna, where she continues to work as a curator, cultural manager, and researcher. She has also lived in Beijing and Shanghai and traveled extensively throughout China, deepening her knowledge and becoming one of the few female Sinologists from Chile. She continues her work promoting a transcultural and multidisciplinary debate.

1. Can you tell us about your studies on China?

I believe my studies on China have been a long journey in the deep Taoist sense, understanding the Tao (道) as a path, thus inexorably intertwined with my personal life and destiny. The possibility of dedicating myself to Sinology was largely a result of Yuanfen (缘分), a Chinese concept that can be translated as «predestination.» In my case, it manifested through intricate twists of fate, which brought Chinese studies into my life at a time when I could fully commit to it.

In a formal sense, I spent approximately four years at the University of Vienna’s Department of Sinology, where I had the privilege of being taught by Frau Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, a world-renowned Sinologist. She was a pioneer in addressing 20th-century Chinese history and historiography. Appointed in 1989 at the age of 33 as a Professor of Modern Sinology at Heidelberg University, she made significant contributions to the development of contemporary Chinese studies in the German-speaking world, with her most recent work taking place in Vienna, where she also served as Vice-Rector for Research at the University of Vienna. My education in this context was top-notch, providing me early exposure to the resilience of the Chinese system and the opportunity to study contemporary China—a subject that is politically marginalized in European academic discourse.

I also received a key part of my education at the Department of Intercultural Philosophy at the University of Vienna, where I focused on comparative philosophy, starting from Critical Theory and German phenomenology. Here, I had access to the few scholars working at the intersection of Sinology and philosophy, whose expertise in classical Chinese texts and contemporary debates was essential in shaping my interdisciplinary path.

In essence, my education mirrors Chinese philosophy in its syncretic nature, focused on creating an autonomous line of thought while acknowledging a broader order of things, which one aspires to grasp and interpret.

-How can we approach understanding Chinese culture from our Western and Latin American perspectives?

There are many parallels, both epistemological and historical, between the two cultural continents (China and Latin America) that facilitate mutual understanding. Historically, both China and Latin America were home to great pre-modern civilizations, thus inheriting millenary cultural legacies that coexist syncretically in the contemporary era.

Both regions were victims of colonization, although in China, this process was never total and lasted less time than in Latin America. Nevertheless, the historical trauma of colonization is significant in both cases. They both suffered the consequences of imperialism, including the unilateral exploitation of resources, lack of political and economic autonomy, and structural disadvantages in integrating into international institutions or modernizing. In today’s context of political reordering, these regions share the need for a new order that surpasses the unipolarity imposed by the United States. Both strive to reflect on their current developments broadly, integrating the cultural legacies of their civilizations while questioning the criteria of «progress» imposed during colonization.

In both regions, there is a strong critique of the environmental consequences of the modernization process, rooted in their own cosmologies. This critique is tied to a growing need to live in harmony with nature, a concept that transcends their pre-modern cosmologies and ways of life. In China, this approach aligns with that of Latin American societies with indigenous traditions.

Epistemologically, there are also parallels. Latin American cosmologies and Chinese philosophy focus on the natural world, not from an anthropocentric perspective (as is largely the case in Europe, where the naturalist tradition was crushed centuries ago). Both are oriented towards harmony and balance between humans and nature.

I have personally experienced these parallels with the Latin American worldview and the differences with Western philosophy and political theory, as I dedicated years to comparative studies between Chinese philosophy and European continental philosophy. I spent years attempting to force a dialogue between Adorno and Zhuangzi, between Laozi and Hegel, between Kant and Mozi. This relativized the value of Chinese philosophical tradition, which many in Western academia refuse to define as philosophy because they believe it lacks Transzendenz (transcendence).

Ultimately, I decided to shift the starting point (Ausgangspunkt) of comparative philosophy from the German-speaking academic world towards the Latin American worldview, specifically towards the Mapuche cosmology, with which I find numerous parallels. This is a recent shift in my research. I am optimistic about the results this approach could generate, precisely because of the multiple points in common between both cultures.

For example, in Chinese, the concept of «person» is expressed as «ren» (人), and in Mapudungun as «Che», both terms recognizing the human being as part of a whole, linked to harmony between heaven and earth. This is not in the sense of a monotheistic entity, but as a set of natural laws or cycles of nature that, in both cultures, are above humans, who are considered an integral part of that whole. Just as in Mapuche cosmology, one cannot understand «che» without «Mapu», in Chinese thought, one cannot understand «ren» (人) without «Tian» (天).

-What can we learn from China?

A key reference in understanding China is the book by French sinologist and philosopher François Jullien, titled “Umwege” ( Detours in English). In it, Jullien explains the reasons for studying China, which align with reasons I consider valid for myself and extend to all of the West. He argues that China can provide answers to questions forgotten by Western academia—ontological questions about being and the whole. These are crucial themes for understanding ourselves, our environment, and making sense of life, yet they have fallen out of favor in Western academic discourse, dominated by rationalization, positivism, and scientific imperatives.

In a time of major changes—a global reordering and a questioning of the dominant systems—perhaps we are witnessing a civilizational shift, and certainly a turning point where the survival of planetary life and its rich biodiversity is at stake. Given this, it’s essential that we revisit these forgotten questions. This need is even more pressing in light of a growing transhumanist trend linked to a political-economic project for humanity. In this regard, China has much to offer.

Unlike Latin American indigenous traditions, China’s rich cosmology is systematically documented and has continuity over several millennia, making it unique, accessible, and exquisite. China has undergone—and continues to undergo—radical transformations. More than 2,000 years ago, Chinese intellectuals were already asking questions that concern us today. We can enrich ourselves by reflecting in this civilizational mirror, as Jullien suggested for Europeans. While this idea may not have found much acceptance in Europe, it could resonate in Latin America due to epistemological parallels between both cultures.

Contemporary China, with its remarkable economic and ecological development and its pivot toward a more sustainable society, has much to teach us. Its trajectory is closely tied to a renewed connection with its natural philosophy, which is resurging. As a result, China serves as an example and case study for many developing countries facing environmental disasters alongside economic growth challenges.

-What are the most relevant cultural elements of China to understand Oriental society in contrast to Western society?

We cannot equate China with the entire Orient, as that region is much broader and more complex. However, we can draw comparisons, with China serving as an example of an «Eastern» society—or, more accurately, a non-Western one.

From a historical perspective, given China’s intense modernization and rapid change, some of the most interesting points of comparison are the fact that «Eastern» societies are primarily collective. This means that individuals recognize themselves as part of a social group, and from that foundation, they build their value systems, epistemologies, and ontological questions. This is vastly different from the individualistic societies of the West, where individuals are solely responsible for defining and determining themselves. This contrast is especially intriguing when examined through archetypal lenses.

One consequence of this distinction is that in the West, the theme of guilt predominates (which arises and is directed towards the individual). Meanwhile, in Eastern societies, shame takes precedence—a sense of responsibility shaped by how one’s actions are perceived by others. These differences are essential in understanding how both societies function and are fascinating to analyze, especially when considering how the unconscious and the ego are constructed.

Another critical difference is between predominantly monotheistic Western society and polytheistic or animistic Eastern traditions (though this is a simplification). In China, there has never been a dominant religion or a concept of heaven and hell like those in monotheistic religions. Instead, there is an emphasis on the here and now, something that can intuitively be identified in Chinese pragmatism and even the flexibility of the Chinese system. Politics in China has been understood as a practical matter, oriented towards stable, long-term governance. While there is a relationship with «natural principles,» governance has been essentially secular for over 2,000 years. 

This legacy is not easily forgotten, and even though the ruling party identifies with communist ideology, governance is not always marked by ideologies as it is in the West. Instead, there is a strong pragmatic element in defining public policies and strategies. This approach offers great flexibility and resilience to the system, enabling it to incorporate seemingly «contradictory» elements, such as the predominance of a free market system under communist ideology. I believe this is one of the most challenging aspects of the Chinese system for Westerners to understand. Studying Chinese history and political theory can help bridge this comprehension gap.

-Is the global geopolitical order really changing? What can we expect in the coming decades?

Yes, the global geopolitical order has already shifted significantly. The unipolar dominance led by the United States and, more broadly, the West, over the past few decades has given way to a multipolar world. For a time, many believed in the «end of history» (as theorized by Francis Fukuyama), where liberal democracy and free-market capitalism would reign as the universal order. The first two decades of the 21st century seemed to confirm this with widespread globalization and adherence to a common economic system.

However, history has predominantly been multipolar. For centuries, China and India were major centers of power in Asia, much like the Inca, Maya, and Aztec civilizations in the Americas. The unipolar moment of the late 20th and early 21st century was an anomaly in this broader historical context. What we are witnessing today could be seen as a return to a more «natural» state of global affairs, with Asia, and particularly China, reclaiming its position as a major pole of power.

The current multipolarity differs from the bipolarity of the Cold War. During the Cold War, ideologically opposed superpowers (the U.S. and the USSR) dominated global politics, with China acting as an independent pole. The loss of this clear ideological division, along with the decline of former powers like the U.K. and the non-aligned movement, gave rise to extreme unipolarity. But this has now changed, with several key developments exemplifying the shift:

– War in Ukraine: This conflict and the successive waves of sanctions it triggered have revealed cracks in the international order. Many countries, representing more than 50% of the world’s population, have abstained from fully backing these sanctions. This reflects a growing dissatisfaction with the current global order, which is often criticized as hypocritical for selectively addressing human rights violations based on political interests. This criticism has gained even more traction after the outbreak of the Gaza conflict, intensifying debates in the Global South.

– New Cooperative Frameworks: Bilateral and multilateral agreements outside the traditional international institutional framework are proliferating. These include the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s growing ties with Africa (FOCAC), and various agreements between China and countries like Oman and Saudi Arabia for energy, and India and Russia for arms deals. The BRICS bloc is also emerging as an alternative to Western-dominated forums like the G20 and G7. These developments challenge the existing order and build parallel pathways that erode the old structures.

– Economic Contraction and Crisis: The economic impacts of this shift are already being felt in households worldwide. The global economy is highly sensitive to these changes, and the foundations of globalization—open markets, dynamic trade, and integrated supply chains—are being disrupted. This disruption is further aggravated by conflicts in Ukraine and tensions around Taiwan, both of which have the potential to severely affect global trade.

Looking ahead, we are likely to see more regional or bloc-based trade agreements that bypass traditional international organizations like the World Trade Organization (WTO). A deepening of multipolarity, with its inherent conflicts, seems inevitable, as countries and regions assert their own interests. The rise of alternative economic systems, trade agreements using local currencies, and military alliances outside the Western sphere are all part of this trend.

The risk of large-scale conflicts that could threaten humanity’s survival cannot be discounted. In parallel, the environmental crisis looms ever larger, requiring a collective global effort. However, the current fragmented geopolitical landscape makes coordinated action on climate change increasingly difficult.

In summary, the coming decades are likely to be characterized by further divergence from the old unipolar order, growing multipolarity, potential conflicts, and a challenging global environment that complicates cooperation on existential threats like climate change.

6) What is the real importance of BRICS and what does it translate into economically and socioculturally?

BRICS is increasingly gaining importance beyond its intrinsic capabilities. This is because it has become a major reference point for envisioning an alternative order. We see that the key countries challenging the hegemony and overrepresentation of the U.S. in international institutions, and demanding greater influence for themselves, are the very architects of BRICS, such as China, India, and Russia.

These major powers not only express their desires for a more pronounced multipolarity and fairer conditions for economic exchange agreements within BRICS, but also a significant and growing number of countries share these aspirations. This includes many countries in Latin America and Africa, which see BRICS as a hope for more favorable terms in their trade or loans, compared to the stringent conditions imposed by the IMF or the World Bank. We also see wealthy countries, such as Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern nations, viewing BRICS as an alternative to the current model in which they are not represented, and from which, despite their economic power, they have been excluded.

BRICS has de facto become a reference point for this multiplicity of desires, expectations, and urgencies for a new global order, and has transitioned from being merely an economic cooperation forum to a symbol of the emergence of a multipolar order. The key to this transition may lie in the equitable representation of these new powers that currently do not have a place at the table of existing institutions and are excluded from international decision-making or feel underrepresented. The case of India is particularly notable, as it is the most populous country on the planet, an emerging superpower, yet it does not even have a seat on the UN Security Council.

This is the main importance of BRICS, as without it, none of what I have mentioned would have a concrete development channel. BRICS can contain and channel many of these concerns, and although its scope is limited (as it remains essentially an economic cooperation forum), it can serve as a laboratory to test new models of cooperation and exchange that are not related to the prevailing financial institutions. An example of this is the internal debate on de-dollarization and bilateral agreements among some members to trade in local currencies.

7) After three decades of rapid growth, China is experiencing a slowdown. How can this be explained and what are the prospects in the medium and long term?

This economic recession is not merely a Chinese phenomenon, but part of a global economic downturn exacerbated by the pandemic and intensified by a shift in international politics from economic to political considerations, with major powers making economic commitments primarily to pursue geopolitical objectives.

China made a significant effort to integrate into the international order by opening its markets to foreign capital and accepting the rules of globalization. Based on this, it underwent a massive process of modernization, industrialization, technological advancement, and unparalleled economic growth. However, it later realized that these rules did not represent a sincere effort to build an equitable international system, as promised by the rhetoric of free markets ensuring that those with competitive advantages would win. It has become increasingly evident that much of the pro-globalization discourse was largely a reflection of what was convenient for the U.S. at a given time. The U.S., as an economic exporter, and with its substantial military presence and overrepresentation in international institutions, managed to impose its vision and interests somewhat effectively for a couple of decades. However, in recent years, there has been growing disillusionment and increasing questioning of this reality.

When China, operating under these external rules, ceased to be the so-called «world’s factory» – a place of low-cost production but also a significant consumer market for high-value foreign products – the U.S. unilaterally changed the rules of the game and began a series of policies aimed at undermining Chinese growth (a trend that Central Europe has recently joined), reaching its peak in the so-called «trade war.» This involved a series of sanctions on Chinese products competing with U.S. goods, aimed at making it harder for Chinese products to access the U.S. market and reducing their competitiveness. However, the U.S. continued to expect and demand that China, in turn, maintain its open access without restrictions, which, of course, China is unwilling to accept. This has had a significant impact on the Chinese economy and deepened the economic recession, which is also reflected globally.

It is not possible to isolate the issue of Chinese economic growth from geopolitics, as both are two sides of the same coin. China, like the international political order, must be restructured considering that the free market system dominant during unipolarity seems to have come to an end. Neither Europe nor the U.S. is willing to accept high-value Chinese products if it harms their economic interests, and we see this reflected in an increase in protectionist policies internally, which constantly undermines the economic structure of the previous order under the banner of globalization.

Therefore, it is difficult to predict the growth figures that existed during the era when globalization was in a state of reorganization. However, there is still sustained economic growth in China, which is interesting considering the global contraction. This reflects its strategic capacity for transformation and reorientation towards other markets and highly competitive technology products that meet current market needs, in which many times U.S. or European products are not as competitive, such as in the solar panel and electric vehicle industries.

“It is expected that the multipolar trend will deepen, with the conflicts it generates due to the multiplicity of interests at play that often lead to disputes.”

maría jesus sanhueza

In conclusion, while China is not expected to achieve the growth figures of the 1980s, 1990s, or early 2000s, it is likely to maintain sustained economic growth and continue to reorient towards new markets, with an even stronger shift towards the digitalization and technologization of its industry.

– In the 1980s, China implemented a controversial measure to control its population by allowing only one child per couple. Today, China has experienced two years of population decline for the first time. What are the medium- and long-term consequences of this population decrease?

China has historically faced demographic problems, which is often forgotten. Many dynasties experienced these issues, as did early 20th-century China and the Mao era, and it continues today, with the difference being that its problem was overpopulation, and now it faces a decline. For much of human history, China was the most populous country (civilization), and given its limited arable land, this represented significant challenges and made demographic issues a constant concern for its governments.

Currently, China is facing a serious demographic decline, which could pose significant challenges for its future due to the lack of young people, a crucial factor for economic growth. This is combined with the issue of caring for and supporting an aging population, which already far exceeds the younger population.

The government has attempted to encourage the youth to have more children, but it is challenging for young people to envision this, as there is still no established welfare state and the economic cost of raising children is very high. This creates a disincentive for young people who are building their careers or struggling to enter the labor market during economic contraction.

However, this, like the economic crisis, is also a global phenomenon. China is part of a global trend, with the particularity that, due to the relative weight of its economy, its demographic problem and its economic implications could have consequences for the entire world.

-China has been criticized for decades for its highly polluting production methods. Is China now effectively producing in a more environmentally friendly way, or is this just greenwashing?

-This is a very interesting issue, as it intersects with historical and colonial legacies and the historical context of industrialization. The major powers were the ones that industrialized quickly, giving them significant economic and military advantages. But this process came at a high environmental cost, something we are very familiar with in Latin America. This was also one of the causes of the colonial period due to the increasing demand for natural resources by colonial powers. Today, those same powers are driving the Green Agenda and criticizing emerging countries for their lack of environmental policies, which often respond with resentment and defend their own industrialization processes, similar to those experienced by the major powers, but out of sync.

Thus, there is a historical and political context that should not be overlooked, and China is part of this context as it began its industrialization process comparatively late, only in the 1950s, and with significant force during the 1980s. At that time, it was a rapid process with little regard for environmental concerns due to the poverty in which China was situated. However, this has changed significantly, and China has made an unprecedented transition to renewable energies in record time. This is intertwined with the immense economic growth and consequent social transformations, as the prosperity brought by rapid growth generated new interests and problems within China, such as a strong interest in environmentally friendly development and increased environmental awareness among the population. This is reflected in the government’s strong interest in sustainable development, addressing a range of factors, including avoiding potential political conflicts and discontent among the population, re-aligning with its own traditional natural philosophy, and dealing with concrete geographic issues due to the deterioration of certain ecosystems. Additionally, China’s reality of having more inhabitants than available natural resources necessitates extreme attention to resource management, as resources are very limited.

Moreover, and this is the most interesting point to highlight, China has economically pivoted towards the production of sustainable products, becoming the global leader in solar and wind energy, as well as the largest producer of solar panels and electric vehicles. It has also carried out the most ambitious reforestation project in human history, “The Great Green Wall,” which involves planting over 50 billion trees. These, among other significant elements, are part of its green transition and its plans to become a zero-emissions power by 2060.

Therefore, I believe this is not greenwashing but rather a macroeconomic transformation that does not solely address political interests or agendas but also has a very concrete economic interest. By transforming its industry towards these sectors, China has a specific economic interest in the world making this transition. Furthermore, we often forget that China remains a developing country, categorized as upper-middle income, like Mexico and Brazil, with a sector of the population still having a modest consumption power. This is reflected in per capita pollution levels that differ significantly from developed or high-income countries. China does not rank among the top fifty most polluting countries per capita (based on data from international agencies such as the International Energy Agency), even falling below Chile! However, due to its size, it is the largest polluter in absolute terms, responsible for approximately 30% of global CO2 emissions, placing it in the spotlight when discussing the climate crisis. While it remains one of the most polluting countries, this is not due to the lifestyle of its inhabitants, nor does it negate the fact that an unprecedented green transition has occurred. It is related to its size and industrial capacity.

This is the problem when analyzing these issues without considering the historical context and colonial legacy. Developing countries legitimately claim their right to pursue economic growth processes, and not having large capital often makes it difficult to focus more on sustainability. Nevertheless, it is clear that the world is not at the same point of development as during the colonial period and is facing an unprecedented environmental crisis, which places high pressure on making the green transition as soon as possible, leaving no room for unsustainable growth.

10) One aspect that concerns local producers in Chile and globally is that they cannot compete with the prices of Chinese products, leading many to go bankrupt. What is your view on this situation?

This issue is not necessarily about China itself but rather about Chile’s economic and development model, which is oriented towards the export of low-cost raw materials and relies on importing high-value products. This perpetuates the vicious cycle of underdevelopment, a reality that affects all of its trading partners.

Unlike other countries in the region, Chile did not undergo a significant industrialization process. Before the free trade agreement with China (which Chile was a pioneer in Latin America), there was a small artisanal industry that could not compete with the low production costs of Chinese products. However, this small industry was unfortunately not significant enough to impact the national economy, which has been, and still is, focused on exporting natural, agricultural, and livestock resources—industries that saw exponential growth due to the opening of the Chinese market.

Therefore, there is a fundamental issue to address regarding the type of economic development being promoted in Chile, its strategy, sustainability, and beneficiaries. This issue is not directly related to China but is an internal problem in Chile’s relationship with the rest of the world. Specifically, and within the logic of this model, China represents an economic development opportunity for the country. Although China does not need to import highly complex products, it is a large market for Chilean products. Unlike other trading partners who have applied a purely extractive model, China presents itself as a commercial partner open to infrastructure investment in the country—a model that China promotes in its commercial relationships, referred to as “mutual benefit,” distinguishing it from other partners. This approach positions China as an attractive trade partner, not just for Chile but for the entire region, regardless of political sectors.

For instance, during the last government visit to China last year, Chile secured an unprecedented agreement for the co-production of lithium batteries worth over $250 million. This deal not only represents a historic milestone in Chile’s commercial agreements but also includes a technology transfer agreement. It is a «win-win» agreement that benefits both countries (as China also aims to secure its lithium supply) and contrasts with the purely extractive nature of Chile’s relations with other trading partners.

Interview by Sebastián Saá